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vs. 
* * * 
NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, an Idaho 
corporation, and DONALD FRIIS, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
* * * * 
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VICTORIA JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. : CV 2006- 7150 
DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MOT! ON 
NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, an Idaho 
corporation, and DONALD FRIIS, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
AT: Kootenai County Courthouse, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
ON: Wednesday, September 8, 2010, 3:37 p.m. 
BEFORE: The Honorable Lansing L. Haynes 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
James McMillan, Attorney at Law 
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7 
Wallace, ID 83873 
For Defendant North Idaho College: 
Bruce J. Castleton 
Naylor & Hales, PC 
950 West Bannock, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
PAGE1 - PAGE 4 
;:SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO.• 38605-2011 
' 
'. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
g 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We're on the record in First 
District Court for Kootenai County. I'm District Judge 
Lansing Haynes. The 3:30 matter before the Court today is 
the matter of Victoria Johnson versus North Idaho College. 
It's Civil Case; 2006-7150. 
Plaintiff in the matter is represented by 
Mr. James McMillan. Plaintiff and Mr. McMillan are 
present. North Idaho College is represented today by -
is it Mr. Bruce Castleton? 
MR. CASTLETON· Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And they are present 
Mr. Castleton is present on behalf of North Idaho College. 
This is the time set for a hearing on 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has 
read the submissions in support of and in opposition to 
the summary judgment motion and has familiarized itself 
with the history of the matter up into the federal court 
system and then back down into the state court system. 
So if the parties are ready I'll turn to the 
defense and say, you may make your argument 
MR. CASTLETON: Thank you, Your Honor. I 
appreciate it 
The Court is right. This case has had a long 
history. It started, well, factually in 2001. As far as 
5 
Ms. Johnson did not expect Ms. Bundy to understand or to 
2 ascertain anything that had gone on with respect to 
3 Donald Friis. She simply said that I told her that I felt 
4 uncomfortable. I didn't expect her to know that he had 
5 been flirtatious or that these other events had happened. 
6 I think that's significant to the claim here today. Aside 
7 from this conversation with Ms. Bundy she never told 
8 anyone else employed by NIC about anything that had gone 
9 on with Mr. Friis's class in the fall of 2001. Between 
10 the fall of 2001 and the spring of 2004 semester 
11 Ms. Johnson never saw Mr. Friis except on one isolated 
12 occasion at a restaurant where they never had any contact. 
13 So really there was no substantive contact between the two 
14 during those about 3-1 / 2 years' ti me 
15 In January of 2004 Ms. Johnson decided she 
16 would again start taking classes at NIC. In doing so she 
17 met with an academic advisor, Judy Beckendorf. And 
18 Ms. Beckendorf recommended that Ms. Johnson again take 
19 Mr. Friis' s computer cl ass. Ms. Johnson's only response 
20 to that was: "Do you have any other sections available?" 
21 She never related any of the events that had allegedly 
22 happened in 2001, never related to Ms. Beckendorf she 
23 thought she had been harassed. She just simply asked her: 
24 "Are there any other instructors available?" When 
25 Ms. Beckendorf said there weren't, Ms. Johnson elected at 
7 
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the lawsuit, it started in 2006. And it's gone to many 
2 corners to make its way back to state court here 
3 Real briefly I'd like to do a quick factual 
4 summary because I think some of it is relevant to the 
5 arguments to be made. 
6 Ms. Johnson, as the Plaintiff, began taking 
7 classes relevant to this case in the fall of 2001. And 
8 one of those classes was a beginning computer class taught 
9 by Donald Friis, who's another defendant in this case, 
1 0 who's been dismissed out. 
11 Ms. Johnson claims that during that Fall 2001 
12 semester she was actually harassed by Mr. Friis including 
13 alleging that he was flirtatious with her. And then upon 
14 her communicating to him that she wasn't interested in 
15 dating anyone, he started treating her negatively after 
16 that. Ms. Johnson dropped out of NIC halfway through that 
17 Fall 2001 semester. 
18 Sometime shortly after that she met with her 
19 advisor named Judy Bundy and communicated with Ms. Bundy 
20 that she had felt uncomfortable in Mr. Friis's class that 
21 semester, however, she never communicated anything 
22 concretely to him or specifically with regards to any 
23 harassment allegations simply that she felt uncomfortable. 
24 And it's important here that in deposition Ms. Johnson 
25 testified that having not communicated that to Ms. Bundy, 
6 
that point to go ahead and take Mr. Friis's class again. 
2 During that semester Ms. Johnson claims that Friis again 
3 sexually harassed her and specifically alleges that Friis 
4 was overly nice to her -- um -- that he -- um -- I'm 
5 sorry -- he had touched her inappropriately, and that he 
6 had flirted with her. 
7 During the course of that semester Ms. Johnson 
8 also was tutored by Mr. Friis's teaching assistant, an 
9 individual named Sharon Olson. Ms. Johnson claims that 
10 she had also told Sharon Olson that she felt uncomfortable 
11 in Mr. Friis's class. But, again, there were no specific 
12 allegations. There were no specific details. Only that 
13 she felt uncomfortable. 
14 Midway during the 2004 spring semester, 
15 Ms. Johnson again dropped out at that point for various 
16 reasons, however, before she dropped out she asked 
17 Mr. Friis if he would give her an "I" or an incomplete 
18 grade in his cl ass. Mr. Friis agreed to do so despite the 
19 fact that it was contrary to NIC' s policies for a couple 
20 of reasons. First of a 11 , according to the policy, you 
21 had to be in the semester almost three-quarters of the way 
22 through to be entitled to that incomplete grade. And you 
23 also had to have a certain grade at the midterm. 
24 Ms. Johnson's grade was a D mi nus, which made her 
25 ineligible. So essentially Mr. Friis gave her that "I" 
8 
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grade when he shouldn't have, but that was the grade that 
2 she left his class with 
3 Ms. Johnson then alleges that after she dropped 
out of school that Mr. Friis contacted her numerous times 
5 over the summer of 2004 asking her out on dates. Finally 
6 in August of 2004, Ms. Johnson communicated to Mr. Friis 
7 that she did not want to have a relationship with him and 
8 that she also felt that it was unethical for him to be 
9 asking her out because he was her instructor, At that 
point it's undisputed that Mr. Friis never had any contact 
with her again. And that that conversation was the last 
that she had with him. 
In October 2004 Ms. Johnson's grade 
automatically changed from an "I" to an "F" in Mr. Friis's 
VICTORIA JOHNSON vs. NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, et al 
1 her grades on the computer. And Ms. Johnson then saw that 
2 her grade for Mr. Friis's class was an "F". At that point 
3 Ms Johnson made the assumption that Mr. Friis had taken 
4 action to change her grade in retaliation for Ms. Johnson 
5 not going out with him At that point Ms. Johnson then 
6 related to Judy Bundy these allegations of sexual 
7 harassment both from 2001 and 2004 claiming that she felt 
8 she had been harassed and identifying specific actions 
9 that Friis had allegedly taken that were sexual 
1 0 harassment. 
11 At that point Judy Bundy specifically told 
12 Victoria Johnson that Bundy was obligated under NIC policy 
13 to report those al 1 egati ons. She didn't give her a 
14 choice. She didn't say "Well, if you want me to, I'll 
class. That was a matter of course. Mr. Friis had no 15 go." Ms. Bundy said she was obligated to report them. In 
input. He took no action. There's no evidence he had any 16 fact, she did report them to NIC Human Resource's 
involvement in that. It was simply a matter of Ms. 
Johnson not having completed the course work by that time 
period. I think the policy says it has to be a certain 
number of weeks into the next semester the course work has 
to be done. It wasn't done. So her grade automatically 
changed from the "I" to the "F". 
In January of 2005 Ms. Johnson again decided to 
start classes at NIC. And she went to her counselor 
Ms. Judy Bundy again. And they started looking through 
9 
1 February of 2005. Upon doing that Brenda Smith convened 
2 the NIC -- it's called the Sexual Harassment Advisement 
3 Committee or SHAC. The SHAC then investigated the 
allegations, interviewed Friis, interviewed Johnson. And 
5 in May of 2005 SHAC determined that Friis had, in fact, 
6 violated NIC anti-harassment policy by asking Victoria 
7 Johnson out while he still controlled her grade in that 
8 class. The SHAC recommended the strongest possible 
9 punishment. NIC president, Mike Hooper, offered Friis the 
opportunity to resign in lieu of termination, which Friis 
did in June of 2005. 
Thereafter Johnson filed a complaint with the 
Idaho Human Rights Commission. The IHRC investigated and 
found there was no liability by NIC for reasons we'll go 
into a little bit. Then Ms. Johnson filed this present 
action in September of 2006, named Mr. Friis and NIC as 
Defendants. The Defendants then removed the case to 
federal court. After discovery the Defendants both moved 
for summary judgment. U.S Magistrate Candy Dale issued a 
report and recommendation in August of 2000 -- or I'm 
sorry·· in 2008, recommending dismissal of all claims. 
U.S. District Judge Lodge approved that. And it was then 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit upheld 
all of the dismissals, except for the Idaho Human Rights 
Act Claim, which is an educational harassment claim under 
11 
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17 Di rector, who at that t 1 me was Brenda Smith. 
18 Ms. Smith was also the affirmative action officer for the 
19 college who was the individual designated to receive 
20 complaints of harassment on behalf of the college. 
21 Once Brenda Smith received this information of 
22 these allegations she went to Victoria Johnson and 
23 inquired with her and interviewed her. And then Ms. Smith 
24 invited Victoria Johnson to submit a written complaint of 
25 harassment against Friis. Victoria Johnson did that in 
10 
the IHRA. As the Court is aware from the record, the 
2 Ninth Circuit found that Judge Dale improperly interpreted 
3 that act under Title IX when it should have been instead 
4 interpreted under a Title VII repondeat superior analysis. 
5 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the U.S. District 
6 Court. The U.S. District Court without taking any 
7 additional action remanded it back to state court and, in 
8 fact, found that the state court was a better venue to 
9 decide the legal terms of the IHRA, which brings us to 
10 today, we filed this motion, Your Honor. 
11 I do want to address real quick the first issue 
12 that we've raised, and that is the Ninth Circuit's ruling. 
13 As our briefing has set forth. it's our position that this 
14 court is not bound by the Ninth Circuit ruling on whether 
15 the IHRA should be interpreted under a Title IX or Title 
16 VII analysis. And I think the reason of that is 
17 understanding the law of the case doctrine. Certainly if 
18 a state district court had issued a decision. gone up to 
19 the Idaho Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court they issue 
20 -- they decide a question of law, and it comes back down, 
21 then that typically becomes the law of the case, but this 
22 is different here. Because if this district court• s 
23 decision - - I'm sorry if this court finds that it's 
24 bound by the Ninth Circuit and goes up to, say, the Idaho 
25 Supreme Court, the Idaho Supreme Court doesn't have the 
12 
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authority to review the Ninth Circuit's decision because 
they're in different chains of appeal. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has no authority over the Ninth Circuit. The Idaho 
Supreme Court does have authority, obviously, over this 
court. I believe this court has the opportunity because 
it is an interpreter of state law. Where the Idaho 
Supreme Court has the ultimate power to interpret what the 
state law is, this district court has an opportunity to 
give its own evaluation, interpretation of what the Idaho 
Human Right Act means. It's a matter of whether a state 
court can be bound by a federal appeals court ruling on 
state law. And so it's our argument that this court does 
have the opportunity to really pass upon the IHRA claim --
what that means. I mean, there is no law as to what that 
means. And that's what U.S. magistrate Judge Dale found. 
And that's why she sent it back to this court because it's 
a unique question of law that's never been passed upon. 
One of the things that we mention in our 
briefing is that typically the Ninth Circuit when it comes 
across an uncertain question of state law will certify it 
to the State Supreme Court. For whatever reason they 
didn't do that in this case. I think this case would have 
been a prime opportunity to do that. The Supreme Court 
could have taken it and could have interpreted it and then 
given it back to the Ninth Circuit. They could have ruled 
13 
have been met in favor of NIC. 
So it's our argument for the same reasons why 
the Plaintiff's Title IX claim was dismissed in federal 
court this court should likewise dismiss her IHRA claims 
because it's the same framework. The same facts are at 
play. There was no genuine issue of material fact and 
dismissal was warranted; however, in the event that this 
court either decides that it's bound by the Ninth 
Circuit's decision or on the Court's own analysis decides 
the Title VII repondeat superior analysis applies, we've 
raised what's called the Faragher affirmative defense. 
And that's the Faragher v. City of Boca Raton case. There 
are three elements that need to do that in order for NIC 
to have not immunity but for there to be no liability 
under the Title VII repondeat superior analysis. 
The first element is that there was no adverse 
education action taken against Ms. Johnson by NIC. That's 
when you analogize it to a Title VII case, an employment 
case. That's where the employer has not taken any adverse 
employment action against the employee, for example, 
termination, suspension, demotion, something like that. I 
mean, in the Title VII context there's that adverse 
employment action. Well, we're looking at the same thing 
accordingly, and we might not be here. But given where we 
2 are today -- and I've done some extensive research and 
3 have not a found case similar to this where a federal 
4 appeals court has ruled upon an issue of state law and 
5 then it gets back into the hands of the state court. And 
6 the question arises: Well, did the law of the case apply? 
7 It's our argument that it doesn't. 
8 In the event that this court adopts that ruling 
9 or adopts that argument, we, of course, believe that the 
10 IHRA, the educational discrimination provision, should be 
11 interpreted consistent with Title IX, which is the federal 
12 anti-discrimination statute for education. And I would 
13 point to Judge Dale's report recommendation where she does 
14 a pretty detailed analysis as to why the IHRA should be 
15 interpreted under Title IX. The Court is aware of the 
16 Gebser decision, which is the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
17 having to do with discrimination and education. 
18 The Gebser decision applies Title IX to 
19 education discrimination claims and lays out the framework 
20 that the U.S. District Court used in Title IX, that is, 
21 was there adequate notice to the college? And if there 
22 was, did the college react with deliberate indifference? 
23 It's that two-prong standard. That is how Ms. Johnson's 
24 Title IX claims were dismissed where the district court 
25 found and the Ni nth Circuit upheld that those two prongs 
14 
something that materially affects Ms. Johnson's education 
2 experience similarly to that employment action. 
3 It's interesting to note that the Idaho Human 
4 Rights Commission really in this point was a step ahead of 
5 the Ninth Circuit where the Idaho Human Rights Commission 
6 went ahead and applied the Title VII repondeat superior 
7 analysis and then applied the Faragher affirmative defense 
8 in finding that NIC was not liable. That's what the IHRC 
9 thought was pertinent. In doing so the IHRC also found 
10 that there was no negative educational action. The only 
11 one that's really been raised by the Plaintiff is this 
12 question of whether the grade change from an "I" to a "F" 
13 was done intentionally by Mr. Friis out of a retaliatory 
14 motive. And both the IHRC, the Sexual Harassment Advisory 
15 Committee, and Judge Dale, U.S. magistrate, all found that 
16 this was not done. It had nothing to do with Mr. Friis. 
17 This wan an automatic grade change as we pointed out. 
18 There is simply no evidence that Mr. Friis had any 
19 involvement in that automatic change from the "I" to the 
20 "F". There's no evidence in the record. There's no 
21 genuine issue of material fact. In fact, it's 
22 overwhelmingly -- the evidence says that that really 
23 wasn't the case. I mean, really, Mr. Friis shouldn't have 
called an adverse education action. In this case if we're 24 allowed her to have the "I" grade in the first place, but 
talking about expulsion, suspension, a grade change, 25 where he did he had no involvement after that point. And 
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so I think that there is no genuine issue as to the first 
Faragher element. 
The second Faragher element is that NIC 
exercised reasonable care to prevent sexually harassing 
behavior. There's several elements that can be shown by 
the college to qualify for this second element. One of 
them is, and this is what the IHRC also found that NIC had 
a policy in place prohibiting sexual harassment. And it 
also had a complaint procedure in place. All this 
information was readily accessible to both faculty and 
students. There was campus training for both faculty and 
students on that harassment policy and on the complaint 
procedure. And what the IHRC further found was that there 
was an instance in 2004 when this male student game to HR 
Director, Brenda Smith, and complained that he felt 
Mr. Friis was invading his personal space. This was not a 
written complaint of harassment. It was simply this 
student saying, you know, it's making me uncomfortable. 
Brenda Smith affirmatively took swift and appropriate 
action in addressing that even though it wasn't a written 
complaint. She went to Mr. Friis. She notified him of 
it. And she required him to undergo sexual harassment 
training, sensitivity training classes, so that he was 
aware of what he was doing and why that was inappropriate. 
And both the IHRC and Judge Dale found that that was swift 
17 
seriously. And I think NIC clearly qualified for the 
second prong under the Faragher defense. 
The third one is that Victoria Johnson had 
reasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or 
corrective opportunities provided by NIC or to otherwise 
avoid harm. What the Human Rights Commission found and we 
also argued is that she did not take advantage of these 
opportunities. This was clearly shown. She waited in 
this instance several years to report the harassment, the 
other case a year or nine months. She simply did not take 
advantage of those opportunities that were there. She 
certainly had reasons why she didn't. And she's 
enunciated those and has argued those, but none of those 
reasons are really availing here. The Idaho Human Rights 
Commission clearly found that while all those reasons 
might have some significance, they're not enough to place 
liability on NIC for Mr. Friis's behavior under the 
Faragher defense. 
In conclusion, I just want to address a few of 
Ms. Johnson's claims in terms of why the Faragher defense 
should apply. She states that once NIC was placed on 
notice of Friis's behavior and failed to do anything --
that's in her response brief -- I really don't understand 
what she's referring to. The two instances we know of 
where NIC was put on notice as to Mr. Friis's behavior, 
,~ 25 
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1 and appropriate action showing that NIC was abiding by its 
2 own policy in terms of anti -harassment. 
3 Even a better example of NIC abiding by its own 
4 policies was when Ms. Johnson finally made her allegations 
5 known to Judy Bundy in January of 2005. Again, Ms. Bundy 
6 told Ms. Johnson she was obligated to report them. She 
7 reported it to Brenda Smith. Brenda Smith then took all 
8 of these steps that ultimately but quickly resulted in 
9 Don Friis leaving the college. I believe that these were 
10 more than adequate steps and procedures in place. NIC was 
11 taking this very serious. 
12 One other fact that I think is important to 
13 note here is that when Ms. Johnson made her written 
14 complaint of harassment in February of 2005 she was well 
15 past the deadline for her to do that according to NIC 
16 policy. Under NIC policy any complaint or any allegations 
17 or complaints of sexual harassment need to be made within 
18 90 days of the event occurring. Obviously, in February of 
19 2005 we were well past 90 days with regard to the 2001 
20 semester. We were al so well past 90 days with regards to 
21 anything that happened in 2004 that was relevant. Yet 
22 despite that fact that Ms. Johnson's complaint of 
23 harassment was untimely, NIC still went and investigated 
24 and. It took action. And it ultimately let Mr. Friis go. 
25 I think that clearly shows that NIC was taking it 
18 
which was the male student in 2004. In Johnson's own 
2 complaint in 2005, the college acted very quickly and very 
3 thoroughly to address those and did what it thought it 
4 needed to. I don't think that there can be any question 
5 that the college's response was appropriate. It was what 
6 it needed to do. Again, the Sexual Harassment Advisory 
7 Committee quickly took action. The Human Rights 
8 Commission actually commended the college on the steps 
9 that it had taken in response. And Judge Dale certainly 
10 felt that the college's response was swift and 
11 appropriate. 
12 Ms. Johnson claims that -- um -- with this male 
13 student, who made known his being uncomfortable with 
14 Donald Friis, that NIC failed to act reasonably because it 
15 didn't remove Don Friis from the classroom. Well, there 
16 was no requirement that they remove Don Friis. There was 
17 no threat of physical danger. There was no threat of any 
18 imminent danger to any of the students. What Brenda Smith 
19 did was to take him aside, notify him that his behavior 
20 was not appropriate, and require him to submit to this 
21 training, this sensitivity training, the anti-harassment 
22 training, so at least he would know. I think that was 
23 more than sufficient on the college's part to do that. 
24 Ms. Johnson argues that the reason she failed 
25 to take advantage -- one of the reasons she failed to take 
20 
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advantage of their harassment policy was because she felt 
2 that if she did any action or did anything that Mr. Friis 
3 didn't like that he would take that out on her grade. 
4 There's no evidence of that other than Ms. Johnson's own 
5 
6 
7 
8 
conclusory statement. She even admitted at deposition 
there's no evidence. It was just a feeling that she had. 
But that's not enough to relieve her of her responsibility 
to go and to take action and to report it to the college. 
And Judge Dale found the same way, the Human Rights 
Commission found the same way. 
significant. 
I think that's all 
12 She submitted the affidavit of Michelle Cook. 
13 And Michelle Cook al so kind of makes that same general 
14 statement that, you know, she felt that Don Friis might 
15 take something out against them if they didn't do what he 
16 wanted them to, but there's a couple of reasons why that's 
17 really not relevant. One of them is that it happened in 
· ' 18 719 2001. And no claims having do with 2001 or longer are before this court. 
d 20 The other issue is that Michelle Cook didn't 
I 
..... 
I 
I :,~ 
;:,. 
--~t .. 1 
\: 
21 have any evidence. She just said that that's a feeling 
22 she had. She couldn't point to any tangible communication 
23 verbal or nonverbal from Friis that would lead anybody to 
24 believe that he was threatening or holding that over their 
25 heads. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
21 
of then that clearly means repondeat superior because 
that's pointing to someone who acts on behalf of the 
educational institution, not just these general policies 
of the school itself. 
So I think that that's where the Ninth Circuit 
came up and said, you know, where you have that term there 
is repondeat superior liability because then we're looking 
at more than just the school's policies. We're also 
looking at that individual employee. But as I think 
you'll find Judge Dale -- what she found was that there 
was some conflict between the language of the Human Rights 
Act and Title IX but then found that what the IHRA 
generally is meant to do, and it's within the scope of the 
first section where it talks about the scope, is to 
implement the purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
its subsequent amendment of which Title IX is and say what 
we're trying to do is essentially put a framework on the 
state level that mirrors all these federal anti-
discrimination statutes Where Title IX especially as 
it's clarified and structured under the Gebser decision is 
that federal structure for anti-discrimination in 
education then this IHRA section should be interpreted 
consistent with Title IX. And I think that is the 
appropriate interpretation. 
THE COURT: The Ninth Circuit engaged in that 
;\ti 23 
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And so for those reasons Your Honor, we would 
2 argue that this remaining claim, the Idaho Human Rights 
3 Act, the Educational Discrimination Claim should be 
4 dismissed on summary judgment. There is no genuine issue 
5 of material fact remaining here whether this court does 
6 the analysis under Title IX, as we would argue it should, 
7 or under the Title VII repondeat superior. Either way Ms. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Johnson's claim really has no remaining merit to it. It 
should be dismissed. And that's our argument. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Castleton, in what context did 
12 the Ninth Circuit engage in an analysis of the Idaho Human 
13 Rights Act vis-a-vis whether the Title IX or Title VII 
14 analysis applies? 
15 MR. CASTLETON: You know, what the Ninth 
16 Circuit, and this is an argument that was originally made 
17 by Plaintiff. Plaintiff pointed to the specific Human 
18 
19 
20 
Rights Act statute. And I could look it up. It's the one 
the defines what an educational institution is. And at 
the very end it includes the term, "And an agent of an 
21 educational institution." That does not appear in 
22 Title IX. That, you know, the phrase "And an agent of," 
23 that phrase does appear in the definition of an employer 
24 under Title VII. And the Ni nth Circuit adapted the 
25 Plaintiff's argument. And it said where you have an agent 
22 
analysis because the state claims were within the 
2 jurisdiction of the federal court based on the existing 
3 federal claims at that point? 
4 
5 
MR. CASTLETON: Yes, Judge. 
THE COURT: That's why the Ninth Circuit got 
6 involved in Idaho state in IHRA law? 
7 MR. CASTLETON: Yes, Your Honor. It was 
8 because of that supplemental jurisdiction that the Court 
9 had. 
10 
11 
12 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Your response, please, Mr. McMillan. 
MR. McMILLAN: Thank you, Your Honor . 
13 Initially on the application on the binding 
14 effect of the Ninth Circuit decisions, now we would agree 
15 that if this were a brand new case, and we were citing to 
16 this Ninth Circuit decision as persuasive authority that 
17 it would not be binding; however, in this case we're not 
18 just looking at it as precedential authority rather direct 
19 authority as the law of this case. I will admit that al so 
20 in my research I was unable to locate a similar situation. 
21 So I agree with Mr. Castleton that this is somewhat of an 
22 unusual case; however, the IHRA was properly before the 
23 federal court pursuant to supplemental jurisdiction. We 
24 appealed that to the Ninth Circuit again based on the 
25 supplemental jurisdiction that the federal court had over 
24 
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the IHRA. And, of course, with regard to the IHRA, the 
2 Ninth Circuit ruled in our favor, remanded back to federal 
3 district court, and the federal district court kicked it 
4 back here. However, Your Honor, we would argue that since 
5 it was directly raised by an appellate court exercising 
6 jurisdiction over those claims, at least as far as the 
7 parties to this case is concerned, it's binding as the law 
8 of the case. For that matter simple public policy of 
9 judicial economy would render it more prudent that in such 
10 a situation that the -- that the litigation narrows as the 
11 case moves up and down through the appellate process not 
12 broadens. If this court chooses to accept the Defendant's 
13 argument that the federal i nterpretati ans of state law are 
14 not binding upon this court, then, likewise, the federal 
15 interpretations of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, under which 
16 the State tort claims against NIC and Mr. Friis were 
17 dismissed, would not be binding upon this court. That the 
18 affi rmance of that dismissal by the Ni nth Circuit would 
19 likewise not be binding upon this court. So then that 
20 would open this matter up to litigation on a number of 
21 other claims. While that would work to our favor, we 
22 would acquiesce with the federal court decisions thus far. 
23 And we believe that the proper course of action is to 
24 narrow the litigation as the case proceeds rather than to 
25 broaden it. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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13 
14 
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18 
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20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
focus on the Faragher defense, and so I will, likewise, 
respond to what the Defendant had raised in the course of 
oral argument. 
Now, with regard to the Faragher defense, of 
course, at this point we're not considering whether we 
have proven our case by a preponderance of the evidence 
whether we have shown on the record a genuine issue of 
material fact such that a reasonable trier of fact could 
find in any other way. We recognize that at this point 
it's not a slam dunk in her favor; and, hence, we did not 
file a cross motion for summary judgment. However, on the 
issue of adverse education action -- um -- with regard to 
the changing of the letter grade from an "I" to an "F", a 
rational trier of fact could reasonably find that 
Mr. Friis possibly did have a hand in that -- um -- maybe 
at the very least indirectly through his action making it 
impossible for Ms. Johnson to complete the course work or 
almost, you know, akin to a constructive discharge 
argument based upon the -- based upon the harassment that 
is evidenced in the record a reasonable trier of fact 
could show that amounted to an adverse educational action 
by making it impossible for Ms. Johnson to proceed. 
Under the second argument, of course, that's 
under the second prong, is whether the employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
: I 27 
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However, even if this court does not feel bound 
2 by the Ninth Circuit's decision, we would ask the Court to 
3 consider the Ninth Circuit's reasoning as at least as 
4 persuasive authority. Under the federal statutory scheme 
5 you have a distinction between two different statutes that 
6 does not exist under state law. Well, the general policy 
7 -- while there's sections in the Idaho Human Rights Act 
8 stating the general policy of following the federal 
9 framework is a common principle of interpretation that the 
10 specific controls over the general, therefore, even though 
11 there's this broad preparatory language stating that 
12 basically we want a state remedy for federal -- for what's 
13 otherwise federal discrimination laws, on the specific 
14 language of the statute it does say that an educational 
1 5 institution includes an agent of the educational 
16 institution. If the Idaho l egi sl ature had not wished to 
17 include that, then they would not have put that language 
18 in the definition. As such, the more specific definition 
19 in the Idaho Human Rights Act eliminates the distinction 
20 that's present under the federal scheme. As such, Your 
21 Honor, we believe that this court should proceed under the 
22 broader Title VII standard rather than the narrower Title 
23 IX standard. And while the Defendant had raised a number 
24 of issues regarding scope and course of employment in its 
25 briefing, in the course of oral argument he has chosen to 
26 
sexually harassing behavior. Again we have again we 
2 have evidence that Ms. Johnson had - - prior to the 
3 incident and prior to filing the formal complaint had put 
4 NIC staff on notice. Now, whether the context and, you 
5 know, the manner in which this happened is more an issue 
6 for the trier of fact after hearing the testimony of 
7 Ms. Johnson and after hearing the testimony of Mr. Friis, 
8 we believe that is not appropriate for a decision on 
9 summary judgment at this time. 
10 Also, with regard to -- also, on the next 
11 element that the Plaintiff would be -- the Plaintiff 
12 unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative 
13 or corrective opportunities, again, there's based upon the 
14 circumstances of this case, we believe that a rational 
15 trier of fact could find that Ms. Johnson's failure to 
16 file a formal complaint prior to that time was not 
17 unreasonable. The grade was still in play. It was still 
18 possible for Mr. Friis to take -- it was still possible 
19 for Mr. Friis to take further adverse action against her. 
20 It is shown on the record that Ms. Johnson believed that 
21 there could be retaliation if she took advantage of those 
22 procedures. Again, whether or not that was reasonable 
23 based upon Mr. Friis's behavior, based upon this ongoing 
24 inappropriate behavior, it· s up to a trier of fact rather 
25 than this court at the summary judgment stage to find 
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1 whether or not -- whether or not that was -- whether or 
2 not that was unreasonable: therefore, Your Honor we 
3 believe that initially given the adverse action under 
4 Faragher that renders the affirmative defense unavailable 
5 but even proceeding to the Faragher affirmative defense 
6 based upon the evidence on the record today we have 
7 created a genuine issue of material fact such that this 
8 matter proceed to the Jury. 
9 And. again, with regard to the Defendant's 
' 10 remaining issues raised in lhei r brief I will rest upon 
11 our responses to the same in our brief. unless the Court 
12 had any questions. 
13 THE COURT: Well, one question I do have, 
14 Hr. McMillan. is regarding the Faragher elements. Assume 
15 for a moment that the evidence is that there's evidence 
16 that NIC did not act promptly to prevent or remedy the 
17 sexual harassment claim and assume that Ms. Johnson 
18 reasonably pursued the available remedies for her, if 
19 there is no evidence of adverse educational action, does 
20 the defense prevail then on summary judgment for the 
21 failure to put at issue prong No. 1 of the Faragher 
22 affirmative defense? 
23 HR. HcMILLAN; Well, Your Honor, we believe 
24 that would essentially be an issue of damages. It appears 
25 from the language in the Faragher decision itself that if 
29 
responding to his suggestions? 
2 HR. HcHILLAN: Well, there's evidence in the 
3 record that Hs. Johnson and Hr. Friis could not interact 
4 properly as a student and teacher 1n order to -- in order 
5 to learn the material and to do the course work and 
6 interact as they should due to Hr. Friis's behavior. 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
8 Oefendant's reply, please, 
9 MR. CASTLETON; Thank you, Your Honor, just a 
10 few shOrt points. 
11 First of all, Hr. McMillan raises the point. 
12 well, if we're going to disregard what the Ninth Circuit 
13 has done, does this court also have the right or the 
14 authority to disregard what the district court has done in 
15 terms of dismissing the tort claims earlier in the case? 
16 I think the clear answer to that is, no, it doesn't. I 
17 mean, you have claims that have been ultimately disposed 
18 of by the district court. That issue was appealed in a 
19 proper setting to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit 
20 upheld that dismissal under, you know, very basic 
21 doctrines, the process of the case. those claims ere no 
22 longer valid or active. Plaintiff chose not to apply to 
23 the Supreme Court to see if lha Ninth Circuit was wrong . 
24 And l think that those claims have certainly reached e 
25 dead end . The reason why the i ssue of the Idaho Human 
31 
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1 there·s adverse action and that case would be an actual 
2 adverse employment action, then you don't even proceed to 
3 the two-prong test once you proceed to the two-prong test 
4 after the issue of adverse action has been considered. 
5 THE COURT: All right. So when you say you 
6 think a jury could find that Mr. Friis did change the 
7 grade, based on what evidence in the record could the Jury 
8 make that inference? 
9 HR. McMILLAN: Well, Your Honor. il would be 
10 based upon the fact that he apparently - - even though, 
11 according to counsel for NIC he apparently had the power 
12 to issue a grade of an ''I" at that point, then we believe 
13 that it could be reasonably -- that a reasonable trier of 
14 fact could find that -- could decide whether or not he had 
15 the authority to keep that grade as an •·1·. Also -- um - -
16 even if the grade automatically changed from an ·r·• to an 
17 "F", we believe that a reasonable trier of fact based upon 
18 what's in the record based on Mr. Friis's consistent 
19 harassing behavior of Ms. Johnson, that the fact that she 
20 did not complete that work could be as a direct and 
21 proximate re~ult of Mr. Friis's behavior. Again, ;t would 
22 be akin to a constructive discharge, 
23 THE COURT: So are you saying that there's 
24 evidence in the record that she didn't deserve a O minus 
25 at midterm, but he gave her one because she wasn·t 
30 
Rights Act claim is different than that is because this 
2 claim is still in the air for one, And for another thing 
3 there are these questions that we've already discussed in 
4 terms of a federal appeals court issuing rulings of state 
5 law: so I j us l wanted lo address tha l. 
6 One other point. And the standard, as the 
7 Court is very familiar With. on summary judgment is 
8 certainly the question is: Is there a genuine issue of 
9 material fact? If there is, summary judgment is not 
10 appropriate. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
11 continually said that the nonmoving party has the burden 
12 of providing affirmative evidence to create the genuine 
13 issue of material fact, Some courts uses the term "a 
14 metaphysical doubt.• You have to have more than e 
15 metaphysical doubt to create or to avoid summary judgment. 
16 And I think that's really wtiere we are in terms of the 
17 Plaintiff's argument. There is no affirmative evidence 
18 that Hr , Friis affected the change from the "I" to the 
19 ''F". There is no affirmative evidence that Plaintiff's D-
20 m1 nus grade was real 1 y imp roper, even though that's not an 
21 issue here. There was no affirmative evidence that 
22 Hs. Johnson provided notice to North Idaho College prior 
23 to January of 2005. And that's just what I want to point 
24 out_ A conclosory statement is not affirmative evidence. 
25 Just t o say : • I felt l ike my grade was in danger,•· that' s 
32 
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not sufficient. 
2 So with all that in mind, I appreciate the 
3 Court's time. Thank you. 
4 
5 
6 
THE COURT: Well, let me ask one other question 
about the notice to the college. If the male student that 
has been referred to here tells college officials "I feel 
7 uncomfortable based on Mr. Friis's actions," and they 
8 respond to that, why is it not a failure to respond when 
9 Ms. Johnson says, "I feel uncomfortable" to a teaching 
10 assistant? 
MR. CASTLETON: think that's a fair question. 
12 First of all, the male student said more than 
13 just that he felt uncomfortable to Ms. Smith. He went and 
14 said: "This makes me uncomfortable because this is what 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Mr. Fni s is doing. He's invading my personal space. " 
Ms. Johnson never took those additional steps to explain 
why. And, again, her own testimony was she didn't expect 
Ms. Bundy to know what she was referring to when she said: 
"He makes me feel uncomfortable. . 
THE COURT: Very well. It's taken this court 
an entire career to try to determine what a reasonable 
22 doubt means. I'm not even going to try to tackle "a 
23 metaphysical doubt." So, on that note -- I thought that 
24 was a very interesting phrase to hear -- I'm going to take 
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decision. 
2 I thank both counsel for excellent briefing and 
3 for a good argument today. And it was very enjoyable to 
4 hear from both of you. I'll get that order out as quickly 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
as I can. 
MR. McMILLAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You're excused. We're adjourned. 
(Discussion had off the record.) 
THE COURT: Oh, let's stay on the record for 
10 just a moment. That's a very good reminder. Thank you. 
11 While this decision is being made, is this 
12 matter ripe to be setting it for a trial date? If we set 
13 it for a trial date, we can always undo that if I grant 
14 summary judgment. If I decline to grant summary judgment, 
15 then we' re moving towards trial. 
16 What do you think, Plaintiffs? 
17 MR. McMILLAN: Well, I don't have my available 
18 dates with me, but we would certainly have no objection to 
19 having the matter move forward. And I can get the Court 
20 my available dates once I get back to the office. 
21 
22 
THE COURT: What do you think, defense? 
MR. CASTLETON: I think it would be 
23 appropriate, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: All right. 
25 the matter under advisement and issue a written memorandum 25 MR. CASTLETON: Just if we want to set up a 
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2 
3 
think that it's probably ripe to do that at this point. 
THE COURT: Probably what I'll do is we'll send 
4 out a notice of status conference for the month of 
5 
6 
October. And the parties can submit a writing in lieu of 
personal appearance at that status conference. And then 
7 we'll get a trial date set based upon that. You can 
I 8 9 
10 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
I:~ 
21 
I 22 
I 23 
,.iW 24 
appear personally if you want to. I always love to see 
you, but you can also write if you don't want to appear. 
MR. CASTLETON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. McMILLAN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
We' re adjourned. 
{The proceedings concluded at 4:20 p.m.) 
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2 
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THE COURT: Johnson versus North Idaho College. 
Are the parties present on that one? Nobody 
4 answering the call on that one. 
5 This is the matter of Victoria Johnson, 
6 Plaintiff, versus North Idaho College, Defendant. 
7 Victoria Johnson is represented by James 
8 McMillan. North Idaho College is represented by Misters 
9 Bruce Castleton and Kirt Naylor. 
10 
11 
This is the time set for a status conference in 
that case. Neither of the attorneys have submitted 
12 writings in lieu of personal appearance and neither have 
13 actually appeared in court today. So without further 
14 input from the parties the Court will set this matter for 
15 a three-day court trial, I think. I don't know that 
16 anyone demanded a jury in their complaint or answer. Let 
17 me take a moment. 
18 (Pause in proceedings.) 
19 THE COURT: One did not come in. There is a 
20 response in the file. It snuck in. 
21 All right. Starting all over again. Both 
22 attorneys have responded in writing in lieu of personal 
23 appearance. The Court did not see it. 
24 Both are agreeing that this matter should be 
25 tried to a jury. Their recommendation is anywhere from a 
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two day to a four-day jury trial. Both are recommending 
2 mediation. And we can do that. 
3 We wi 17 set this, then, for a four-day jury 
4 trial to commence June 20, 2011. 
5 (Discussion had off the record.) 
6 THE COURT: And the scheduling order should 
7 contain the standard mediation order that allows the 
8 parties to schedule their own mediation time and their own 
9 mediator. And that will be all in that matter. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Thank you for saying that. 
THE CLERK: Um-hum. 
(The proceedings concluded at 3:42 p.m.) 
---o0o---
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2 THE COURT: This is the matter of the Victoria 
3 Johnson, Plaintiff, versus North Idaho College, Defendant. 
4 This is Civil Case No.: 06-7150. I thought I was reading 
5 that wrong but 06-7150. 
6 Plaintiff in the matter is represented by 
7 Mr. James McMillan, who is present in court today. 
8 Defendant is represented by Mr. Bruce Castleton, who is in 
9 court today as well. And I thank the attorneys and the 
10 parties for patiently waiting for this hearing. That was 
11 a complicated matter ahead of you that needed to have some 
12 time spent with it, so thank you for your patience. 
13 This is the time set for a hearing on defense's 
14 Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's previous ruling 
15 on summary judgment application by the defense. This 
16 motion is brought under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 
17 Subsection B, Subsection 2. 
18 Are the parties ready for this hearing today? 
19 MR. CASTLETON: Yes, Your Honor. 
20 MR. McMILLAN: Yes, Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: The Court has read the submissions 
22 of the parties both in support of and in opposition to the 
23 Motion for Reconsideration. 
24 So, Mr. Castleton, you may go forward. 
25 MR. CASTLETON: Thank you, Your Honor. "I" 
40 
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I" 1 appreciate the Court's time this morning. 
2 The Court is well familiar with the facts. I'm 
3 not going to touch upon those except as they might be 
4 relevant to our motion. 
5 When we originally filed our Motion for Summary 
6 Judgment there were obviously several issues that we 
7 needed to touch on. There were some areas that we chose 
8 to emphasize over others hopefully in an attempt to aid 
9 the Court's consideration. And there were some areas that 
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we gave more effort in analyzing thinking that they might 
be viewed by the Court as more in need of analysis and, of 
course, trying to predict that the Court might think this 
is more important is an imperfect science. In reviewing 
our summary judgment pleadings I do note we did not put a 
lot of weight into our analysis of the Faragher 
affirmative defense particularly the second prong, and I 
apologize about that. 
In looking back on our pleadings, what we 
essentially did is show what the Idaho Human Rights 
Commission had found and put that forward and used that as 
21 a reason why this court should adopt that. And in doing 
22 so we did not site to numerous of the cases that really 
23 underlied that and support the Human Rights Commission's 
24 findings. And those, of course, are the cases that we're 
25 citing to the Court now and the reason why we're bringing 
2 
3 
41 
course and scope argument. We raised that. I don't 
really think that is applicable anymore. We did raise the 
issue in our brief, but it was kind of nullified out. So 
4 unless the Court has any questions about that I just --
i' 5 what we are saying is there is really no need for the 
6 
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Court to go into that. There is no reason for it to be a 
trial. It's kind of all consumed in Faragher. 
The real question before this court, as I have 
mentioned, is whether Ms. Johnson's untimely reporting of 
harassment is as a matter of law unreasonable to the point 
that NIC should be found or that the Court should find in 
favor of NIC on the second Faragher prong. The underlying 
reason for that isn't just because there are some cases 
out there that say, well, we want you to. Those cases 
really go to the underlying purpose of Title VII. Title 
VII is meant to be a preventative measure. It's not meant 
to be a corrective measure after the fact to provide 
compensation. 
The cases that we cite do make it very clear 
that both parties in this case have a responsibility. NIC 
had the first responsibility to put forth or to put forth 
preventative measures that was its anti-harassment policy 
that was putting forth the way in which a person could 
make a complaint and what NIC would do after the fact. 
But Ms. Johnson also had responsibilities here. Her 
KOOTENAI COUNTY CASE NO. 
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this motion. And the reason that I say that in bringing 
2 this motion I'm not trying to waste the Court's time. I'm 
3 not asking the Court to go to a lot of analysis that it's 
4 already gone through just to see if the Court feels 
5 differently the second time around. 
6 We did not bring a lot of this before the Court 
7 last time. And, of course, that's on us. But there is 
8 this law out there that goes to the send prong of 
9 Faragher. And it's directly applicable to Ms. Johnson's 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
claims in terms of harassment by Mr. Friis and 
particularly her claim that the reason why she did not 
bring a complaint of sexual harassment until after the 
fact, the reason why that was untimely was because of this 
generalized fear of retaliation. There are numerous 
federal cases out there, as we pointed out, that go 
directly to this point and find as a matter of law that 
this generalized fear of retaliation without some 
substantiation, without evidence out there that says this 
fear was credible, that there was something out there that 
gave her an objective reason to think that something 
21 negative might happen to her, that in the absence of that, 
22 that as a matter of law that is an unreasonable failure to 
23 take advantage of the preventative and corrective measures 
24 that NIC had put forth. 
25 Really quickly, Your Honor, in terms of the 
2 
3 
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responsibility was to report that when it was happening to 
report it timely. And the reason for that was so that she 
could give NIC a chance to address it before it came to 
4 the point where these courts have said it becomes so 
5 severe, so persuasive that it then constitutes 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
discrimination and not just harassment. So you have these 
two different responsibilities here. And as we've cited 
to the Holly Vee (phonetic) case, which is a Ninth Circuit 
case, it's really -- it goes on the theory of mitigation 
of damages. It says it's intended to fulfill -- excuse me 
a policy imported from the general Faragher theory of 
damages that a victim has the duty to use such means as 
that that are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid 
or minimize the damages that result from the violations of 
the statute. And so that's really where we get the two 
prongs from. It puts responsibilities on both parties. 
Now, because Ms. Johnson is the victim, this 
whole balancing act is really weighed in her favor. In 
other words, in order for NIC to avoid that vicarious 
liability that she's seeking to avoid, NIC not only has to 
fulfill its responsibilities, which it did, but 
Ms. Johnson also has to fail to fulfill hers. She had to 
have the fulfillment of those two events in order for NIC 
to avoid it. Whereas, in Ms. Johnson's behalf all she 
needed to do is fulfill her part of it. 
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I 
fulfilled its part and Ms. Johnson had done hers, she can 
2 still seek vicarious liability, but she didn't do it. And 
3 NIC had done its part. 
4 Now, I believe the Court did state in its 
5 memorandum decision that NIC had fulfilled the first 
6 prong. I don't know that there's any question about that. 
7 I know the Plaintiff raised that, but unless the Court 
8 believes that that's incorrect I'm just going to assume 
9 that the decision said what it meant. 
10 We go, then, to what Ms. Johnson did or didn't 
11 do. I don't think there's any factual dispute here that 
12 her report of harassment was untimely. It was in January 
13 of 2005 well after her contact with Mr. Friis had long 
14 s i nee ended. Her last contact with Mr. Friis was in 
15 August of 2004. That was the time when she said to him: 
16 "I don't want you talking to me anymore. I don't want you 
17 asking me out. You need to leave me alone. This is 
18 inappropriate. You're an instructor," from which point 
19 Mr. Friis never contacted her again. Four or five months 
20 later, then she sees goes and she sees her grade has been 
21 changed on the computer. She incorrectly assumes that it 
22 was Mr. Friis that did that. That's what then prompts her 
23 to file the report of harassment. It was not done to 
24 prevent or to stop any activity that was going on. That 
25 had all completely transpired and was done. Like I say, 
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Ms. Cook's case or in Ms. Johnson's case. It's just as 
2 we've been saying it's just a generalized fear of 
3 retaliation that's not really based on any actual 
4 evidence. 
5 Now, what the Plaintiff is asking the Court to 
6 do is to essentially say, well, this is a question of fact 
7 that needs to go to the Jury. Whether her belief of 
8 
9 
10 
111 12 
13 
retaliation was reasonable is a question of fact the Court 
really should decide upon it. Let's just take it to trial 
and decide it. Well, as I was thinking about this, this 
is really no different than when a court has the 
opportunity or is called upon to do a finding of 
negligence per se. As the Court is aware, let's say that 
14 there is a negligence claim -- excuse me -- and there's a 
15 statute that's applicable here. The statute establishes a 
16 
117 18 
19 
I 20 21 
1
22 
23 
24 
I 25 
standard of care for everybody that they're required to 
abide by. Now, as negligence per se goes, if the 
Plaintiff is able to point to the statute and convince the 
Court that the statute is applicable and that it had some 
involvement in the damages, and if the Plaintiff can show 
the Defendant violated the statute, then this court 
essentially handles the first two prongs of the negligence 
analysis and finds that as a matter of law there was a 
breach of a duty and the issue never even goes to a jury. 
It just -- it's handled by the Court. 
47 
And that's no 
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it was an after-the-fact thought on her part because she 
2 was angry because she thought that the grade had been 
3 changed because of her failing to give into his advances. 
4 It's also clear from the evidence, Your Honor, 
5 on summary judgment from the discovery that was done that 
6 Ms. Johnson's fear of retaliation was not based on any 
7 objective substantiated reason. She stated in deposition 
8 it was just in her head. She thought, well , he controls 
9 my grade. He's an instructor, so there's a possibility 
10 that could retaliate against me if I didn't do what he 
11 asked me to do, or if I filed this report of harassment. 
12 There's no subjective -- or, I'm sorry -- objective 
13 substantive basis. 
14 Now, in Ms. Johnson's objection to this motion 
15 she cites to the affidavit of Michelle Cook. Michelle 
16 Cook was a classmate of hers in 2001 , not in 2004. And 
17 there was an event where Mr. Friis asked them to 
18 breakfast. And Ms. Cook states in her affidavit, she 
19 says, and I quote: "I felt that as he was our professor 
20 if we turned him down it would have a negative impact. 
21 on our grades." That's really no different than 
22 Ms. Johnson's own subjective conclusory belief without any 
23 other evidence to support it. Mr. Friis never said 
24 anything that would imply that he would do something 
25 negative if they didn't do what he wanted neither in 
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different here. In this case the question is: Did 
2 Ms. Johnson unreasonably fail to take advantage of NIC's 
3 preventative and corrective opportunities? She's saying 
4 it was untimely. She admits it's untimely, but she has 
5 some excuse or reason for that. It's this fear of 
6 retaliation. Well, the cases we cited have made clear 
7 that if that's the only reason why she didn't come 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
forward, then as a matter of law before this ever gets to 
a jury the Court can say that is not reasonable, and that 
as a matter of law that's a failure on her part to timely 
report. And the Court can grant the second prong of 
Faragher just as a matter of course before it gets to the 
Jury. It's no different than that negligent per se 
14 process. 
15 What the Plaintiff is essentially asking the 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Court to do is just to let go of its own responsibilities 
in this aspect to give it all to the Jury. Well, there 
could be some negative consequences to that. If the Court 
were to allow the Jury just to say, was her fear 
reasonable? That can end in a jury verdict that's 
completely contrary to the purposes of Title VII. If the 
Jury says, well, sure, she was a student. He was a 
professor. She could have credibly feared that he was 
going to take some action, so I think that's reasonable, 
again, as we have explained, that's not what Title VII is 
48 ~ 
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Title VII says that the employee, or in this case 
2 Ms. Johnson, has an affirmative responsibility to report 
3 it and that only in some very exceptional or rare 
circumstances are they excused from not doing the timely 
5 report. And I'd like to talk about those exceptions. 
6 There are a couple of cases that we've cited to 
7 where the Court said okay, you didn't timely report, but 
8 there was a good reason for that. One of them was a fear 
9 of retaliation, but in that case, and that is the Cruz v. 
Liberatore case we cited to, the Plaintiff was required to 
show a couple of things. She was required to show either 
that the employer, not the supervisor but the employer, 
had ignored similar reports or complaints of harassment 
from other employees, therefore, making her believe they 
wouldn't do anything about it credible, or she needs to 
show that the employer had actually taken adverse action 
against other employees for making those complaints. So 
this is to say you have an employee, she sees what's going 
on around her, she has this objective credible belief that 
nothing is going to be done, or that there might be 
adverse action taken against her. And the New York case 
says that in that event then that could be justifiable for 
not coming forth and reporting. The other case is the 
Eleventh Circuit case of Weger v. City of Ladue. It held 
that in that case the Plaintiff needed to show that the 
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her, and it's also fair to the employer who wants to have 
that opportunity to cut it off. In this case NIC never 
3 had the opportunity to prevent it because it was never 
4 advised until well after the fact. The Baldwin case 
5 specifically says that, and that's the Eleventh Circuit 
6 case, if the employee wants the opportunity to seek 
7 vicarious liability, they have to overcome that fear of 
8 retaliation. They have to go forward, and they have to 
9 report. It's the same as is here, Your Honor. 
Really quickly, I think Ms. Johnson in her 
statements to NIC, where she actually did file her report 
of harassment, makes very clear that she wasn't seeking to 
prevent anything. And we cited to that in our briefing. 
Her statement -- her written statement to NIC says I'm 
bringing this complaint of harassment, and actually I 
think it would be even more effective to quote it here, so 
I'm not misquoting what the Plaintiff said. This is in 
her complaint. It's in my summary judgment affidavit. 
It's page NIC 534. Ms Johnson -- this is her telling NIC 
about the harassment. She says: "As you can see this 
continues to impact my life So the reason I decided to 
make a formal complaint is so that I can try to put all of 
this behind me." And then she goes forward and says, what 
she's looking for in making a complaint. "I would like to 
receive a "W" for the Intro to Computers class so it does 
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supervisor had made very clear verbal communications to 
2 her that he was going to take adverse action if she 
3 reported or even physical threats of harm that excused the 
4 Plaintiff from reporting here. There is really no such 
5 facts in this case. The facts that we have is that that 
6 there was this general nonspecific fear that just because 
7 he was her teacher that he might take some action against 
8 her. What Faragher, what Ellerth and all these other 
9 cases make clear is that in almost every instance of 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2 
sexual harassment by a supervisor, you're going to have 
that possibility, the power, the disparity between the 
supervisor and the employee is always going to raise some 
fear of retaliation. It's just inherent. But what the 
cases held is that if we just allowed them to bypass the 
power or the responsibility of reporting just because that 
exists, that undermines Title VII. It makes it so nobody 
is ever going to report harassment. And they're not going 
to be able to prevent it. And they're not going to be 
able to cap it off -- excuse me 
severer. 
before it becomes 
Faragher and Ellerth make it clear that the 
employee or Ms. Johnson in this case have two choices. 
She can either come forward and report or she cannot 
report, but if she doesn't report she looses the 
opportunity to seek vicarious liability. It's fair to 
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not affect my grade point. Also, I would like to have my 
financial aid concerns addressed somehow so I may finish 
3 my schooling without paying for those classes that 
4 semester and be reinstated without being penalized." And 
5 then she says: "Even though I would be willing to discuss 
6 what could be done, I would like to see the wrongs that 
7 were done made right so I can go forward in a positive, 
8 empowered, and prideful way once again. 
9 Absent in any of that is Ms. Johnson telling 
10 NIC that she would like them to take some action to 
11 prevent Don Friis from harassing her. And the reason for 
12 that is clear. That had already come and gone. There was 
13 no more harassment taking pl ace. It undermines the 
14 purpose of Title VII to wait until it's over and then to 
15 come and say this happened, but it happened in the past. 
16 But then to try to impose vicarious 1 i ability on the 
17 employer or in this case NIC when they never had the 
18 chance to address it, I think it's abundantly clear from 
19 what actually happened when she came forward with her 
20 report of harassment, NIC took swift action. They 
21 addressed it. They convened their committee. They 
22 investigated it. Within four months Mr. Friis was no 
23 longer employed by the college. It took it seriously. It 
24 wanted to have an opportunity to correct that. It never 
25 had it because she never reported it. 
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1 The cases that we cite, Your Honor, I think it 
2 makes it abundantly clear, and I think this is what the 
3 federal case law is on this point the Faragher affirmative 
4 defense is that that generalized fear does not excuse the 
5 reporting, but that as a matter of law that specifically 
6 says as a matter of law generalized fear does not excuse 
7 the responsibility to report. 
8 Subject to your questions, Your Honor. "I" 
9 appreciate the Court's time. Thank you. 
10 
11 
12 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Plaintiff's response, please. 
MR. McMILLAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 As an initial matter of course, this is clear 
14 from the record the Faragher defense and NIC' s claim that 
15 they had -- they had once it was reported that they took 
16 action has been a central part of their defense through 
17 most of the history of this case, however, Your Honor, I 
18 do recognize that NIC's motion today mainly focuses upon 
19 the reasonableness requirement of the second prong of 
20 Faragher. In the cases that the Defendant cited nowhere 
21 does it specifically say that a fear of retaliation is 
22 never a reasonable cause for a delay and for a report 
23 under the second prong of Faragher. There is some 
24 language in some of these cases that state that simple 
25 uncorroborated generalized fear is generally not 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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15 
16 
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18 
19 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
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in the Spring of 2004, and that Friis was conferring a 
benefit upon Johnson by allowing her an incomplete grade 
when she requested one. The Jury could conclude that, in 
light of Johnson needing Friis's cooperation and that 
'incomplete' grade, that it was understandable that she 
did not fully disclose Friis's conduct to NIC until she 
learned her 'incomplete' grade had been converted to an 
"F". At this point it appears that she believed, although 
mistakenly, that Friis's behavior had prejudiced her 
educational efforts in a very concrete way." 
Thus, this court finds the record to contain 
genuine issues of material fact regarding NIC's Faragher 
affirmative defense. And, Your Honor, therein lies the 
key. It's not just a simple unsubstantiated claim of 
retaliation -- of the fear of retaliation. This court 
found -- it's as evident from the record now as it was on 
October 15th -- that she did believe that there was 
specific conduct that would lead her or a reasonable 
person in her position to believe that this retaliation 
would take place. As such, Your Honor, we're not dealing 
with simple unsubstantiated generalized fear of 
retaliation. 
With regard to the policies behind Title VII, 
actually, of course, Title VII is only being applied by 
125 analogy. The statute we're actually dealing with is Idaho 
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sufficient, however, it's not categorically excluded as a 
2 matter of law under all circumstances under these cases. 
3 It's important -- it's also important to note that the 
4 Defendant does cite to case law which states that where a 
5 fear of retaliation can be justified where the Plaintiff 
6 can show that the employer had taken adverse action in 
7 this case -- and this court even notes this in its oral 
8 memorandum decision -- Ms. Johnson did believe that 
9 changing the - - that changing the "I" to an "F" was 
10 adverse action. 
11 You'll have to excuse my voice today. I'm 
12 still recovering from a nasty case of branch it is. 
13 Whether or not that -- whether or not that may 
14 have been mistaken - - um - - or whether he had the 
15 discretion - - whet her he had the discretion to change that 
16 grade, Ms. Johnson at that time believed that was adverse 
17 action, which would further justify her fear of further 
18 retaliation if she reported the matter. This court 
19 speci fi call y found that this court cannot say from a 
20 standard of viewing the record in the light most favorable 
21 to Johnson that her conduct was unreasonable as a matter 
22 of law. "The road to Johnson's educational goals seemed 
23 to lead inexorably through Friis's computer class. A 
24 reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson was justified 
25 in the hope that Friis's behavior in class would improve 
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Code 675909, however, we do recognize that the standards 
2 are analogous. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Your Honor, this court had properly considered 
the policies, properly considered the factors behind Title 
VII, the Idaho Human Rights Act, and the Faragher defense 
and made its decision. 
Essentially, the only thing that NIC has to add 
is this additional -- is this additional case law which 
focuses specifically upon fear of retaliation and upon 
reasonableness, however, this additional these 
additional facts, which this court cites to specifically 
on page 8 of its opinion, distinguish this case from those 
13 cases. 
14 Your Honor, every case of sexual harassment is 
15 different. We can't lay down a bright line rule that 
16 certain kinds of fears are unreasonable as a matter of law 
17 under all circumstances. The extent that the cases cited 
18 by NIC could be interpreted to hold as such it's important 
19 to remember that we are in state district court. As such 
20 those cases ultimately are persuasive authority. And to 
21 the extent that those cases can be interpreted in such a 
22 manner to foreclose a fear of retaliation, as under all 
23 circumstances as justifying a delay in report, we would 
24 ask the Court not to without similar reasoning in this 
25 instance. 
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THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. McMILLAN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Any reply from defendant? 
MR. CASTLETON: Yes. Real quickly, Your Honor. 
This court did establish several reasons why 
Ms. Johnson could have been afraid of reporting her 
harassment in its decision. And we think we have 
addressed those in our brief. And I didn't want to go 
through all of those today, but I think they are 
addressed. And that includes the power difference between 
her and Mr. Friis, the fact that her class was important, 
even the fact that he had given her a benefit by giving 
her the incomplete grade. All of those still fail as a 
matter of law to justify her untimely report of 
harassment. And Mr. McMillan cites the fact that, well, 
she saw that they had changed her grade, that was 
something that substantiated her fear. Well, let's look 
at the time line to be sure here. 
She discovered and saw the grade change in 
January, 2005, which was actually the very same day she 
first started reporting his harassment to her counselor, 
Judy Bundy, which led to the report to NIC. In other 
words, the grade change did not deter her from doing 
anything. Quite the contrary. The grade change that she 
saw was what, in fact, sparked her to file the report of 
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again, it undermines the whole case here. 
The persuasive authority in the federal cases, 
as we pointed out, no Idaho court case that I found really 
cites to this. And the Supreme Court has told us in 
interpreting the Idaho Human Rights Act when no court has 
cited or there's no Idaho precedent we do look to the 
federal cases. We've gone through this. And these 
federal cases, although I understand they're not mandatory 
upon the Court, they are persuasive and they are in line. 
Subject to the Court questions, that's all I 
have. I appreciate the Court's time. 
THE COURT: Thank you. No questions. Thank 
you both. 
I'm going to take the matter under advisement. 
And I will either write a memorandum decision about the 
Court's decision here or I will schedule a hearing in 
which the Court will announce an oral decision. If there 
is a hearing for an oral decision, counsel can certainly 
appear telephonically to avoid the expense of travel just 
to hear what the Court has to say. But you're also always 
invited into court if you choose to do that. I hate to 
take this under advisement again. I hate to delay a 
decision in this matter, however, these are complex 
issues. And they're not adequately addressed by specific 
Idaho law. And they do take some analysis. The lawyers 
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harassment. It's not like she saw the grade change at the 
2 time that he was harassing her and thought you know what? 
3 If he can change my grade, he might do something else and 
4 that kept her from reporting for a long time. That wasn't 
5 the case. As "I" said, the grade change happened the same 
6 day that she first made her report. And so to say that 
7 was evidence of a fear of retaliation is, in fact, very 
8 incorrect. Even more so she assumed that it was Mr. Friis 
9 that changed her grade when the facts clearly show it was 
10 just done as a matter of course by the college because she 
11 had not completed the work. So a mistaken fear that he 
12 had done something does not substantiate a fear of 
13 retaliation. As the cases show he has to make specific 
14 comm uni cations to her to make cl ear that he's going to do 
15 something to her to justify her fai 1 ure to report. And 
16 that never happened here. 
17 Faragher requires an early report. An early 
18 report in Faragher done by Ms. Johnson would have happened 
19 in 2001 when she first claims that he harassed her in that 
20 first semester. An early report would have happened early 
21 in the spring of 2004 semester when she again says he 
22 starts harassing her. It would have happened in the 
23 summer of 2004 when he is calling her and asking her out. 
24 There was never an early report as required by Faragher. 
25 She waited until after this had all concluded. And, 
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have done a good job of framing the issues and presenting 
2 competing cases; so, I guess, if you do that good a job 
3 then you have to wait for me to sort it out. So the delay 
4 is your own fault for being good lawyers. 
5 Thank you both. You are excused. 
6 MR. McMILLAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
7 MR. CASTLETON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: We are in a recess for -- what do 
9 you need 10 minutes or 15? 
10 
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THE COURT REPORTER: Ten. 
(Recess taken.) 
(The proceedings concluded at 10:08 a.m.) 
---oOo---
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contained in pages numbered 1 through 60 is a complete, 
true and accurate transcription to the best of my ability 
of my shorthand notes taken down at said time and place; 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that said transcript contains 
all material designated in the MOTION AND ORDER FOR 
PREPARATION OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT or any requests for 
additional transcript which have been served on me. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed my official seal this 4th day of April, 2011. 
Ji/,;,' 
-------- ' ------- ,,~,/ -----------------------
LAUR IE A. JOHNSON; C.S.R. No.: 720 
Official Court Reporter 
First Judicial District, State of Idaho 
My Commission Expires 2/6/16 
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